The events of the past week in Azerbaijan reveal a troubling and paranoid shift in Aliyev's power-driven politics. First, Putin made a rare visit to Baku—his first in six years to strengthen the strategic partnership with Baku—followed by Putin's phone conversation with Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan about "normalizing" Azerbaijan-Armenia relations. In parallel, Azerbaijani authorities arrested anti-war activist and researcher Bahruz Samadov, further intensifying a crackdown on so-called "no-war" activists. This timing raises critical questions: how can Azerbaijan internationally talk about peace agreement with Armenia while simultaneously persecuting and blaming those who support it internally with "treason"? And what does Putin’s visit reveal about Azerbaijan’s supposedly "independent" foreign policy? Are these two events connected?
This at first apparent contradictions signal deeper dynamics at play, exposing the intricate web of international, regional, and domestic politics in which Azerbaijan, a postcolonial subject that fancies itself sovereign, remains tethered to its former metropole. The relationship between Baku and Moscow is not one of simple subservience; Putin needs Aliyev as much as Aliyev depends on Putin. The war in Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions have isolated Russia economically and diplomatically, driving Moscow to seek alternative routes for trade and energy exports. Azerbaijan, with its current favorable geographic position, presents an ideal solution for Russia’s need to circumvent these restrictions. In this context, Putin’s visit to Baku marks more than just a intensification of the transit relationship between the two countries, it is also signal of deep trust and security reliability. Russia’s desire to use Azerbaijan as a transit aligns neatly with Aliyev’s ambitions, with both finding mutual benefit in their growing cooperation. Putin’s trip to Baku, his stay at Aliyev’s residence, and their talks on strengthening "strategic cooperation" highlight this balancing act. But the façade of equilibrium begins to crack upon closer scrutiny.
A key issue underpinning this relationship is the Zangezur Corridor, a transit route that connects Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory. Although Azerbaijan had recently claimed to scale back its ambitions regarding this corridor, Putin’s visit suggests that the topic might remain very much alive. Despite official denials, Russia sees controlling this corridor as a way to control the transit routes and to reassert its influence in the South Caucasus, especially as Armenia attempts to distance itself from Moscow. For Aliyev, allowing Russia to manage this route would solidify his own position domestically while catering to Moscow’s regional agenda. In this sense, Azerbaijan is not merely a transit state—it is a conduit through which Russian strategic interests flow, with Baku seemingly willing to play this role as long as it aligns with its own political objectives. Thus, despite Azerbaijan’s previous insistence that no third parties, including Russia, be involved in peace negotiations with Armenia, Moscow seems to have found its way back into the game. As Armenia distances itself from Russia, this renewed convergence between Baku and Moscow threatens to corner Yerevan into difficult choices. The prospect of war, rather than peace, now looms larger than ever, despite any rhetoric to the contrary.
From Transit to Proxy
The transit aspect of Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia is only one side of the story. On the other side lies an increasingly concerning political and ideological alignment between Baku and Moscow. This alignment is most visible in Azerbaijan’s domestic policies, which have grown more authoritarian and repressive, mirroring the playbook often used by Russia to maintain control over its society. The arrest of Bahruz Samadov, an outspoken anti-war activist and scholar, marks the latest in a series of state actions targeting anyone advocating for peace or dissenting from the government’s line on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.
What is striking is the timing: Azerbaijan is simultaneously touting its efforts to "normalize" relations with Armenia while cracking down on peace advocates at home. This duality reveals the contradictions in Aliyev’s strategy. On the surface, Baku claims to be working toward regional peace, but beneath that veneer, it is eliminating any domestic voices that call for genuine reconciliation. Those who dare to engage with Armenian counterparts or support dialogue are branded as "traitors" or "foreign agents," echoing not only Azerbaijan’s familiar strategy but also Russian securitization tactics used to discredit and sanitize civil society. This not only stifles dissent but also aligns Azerbaijan with Moscow’s broader ideological project—one that views liberalism, independent civil society, and Western influence as existential threats.
This alignment goes beyond domestic repression. On the international stage, Azerbaijan’s increasingly aggressive posture toward Western powers, particularly France, highlights its role as a proxy in Russia’s broader struggle against European influence. As Moscow’s relations with Paris deteriorate, Baku has taken up the mantle of challenging France, positioning itself as a loyal ally to Russia’s anti-Western agenda. Azerbaijan’s state-sponsored NGOs and media outlets have been mobilized to amplify narratives that align with Russian disinformation campaigns, particularly those targeting Western influence in the Caucasus and beyond. In this way, Azerbaijan is not just aligning with Russia out of convenience; it is actively participating in Moscow’s geopolitical agenda.
Is brief window of sovereignty over?
Azerbaijan has long claimed to pursue a "multi-vector" foreign policy, attempting to balance relationships with various powers—Russia, the West, and regional players like Turkey—without becoming overly dependent on any one of them. However, the façade of such a policy is increasingly difficult to sustain. While Baku has bolstered its energy ties with Europe since the onset of the Ukraine war, supplying more gas as the EU seeks alternatives to Russian energy, it has paradoxically deepened its oil and gas agreements with Moscow at the same time. This contradictory approach reveals that Azerbaijan’s claims of balancing its interests are more rhetoric than reality.
The reality is that Azerbaijan’s growing economic interdependence with Russia, coupled with its increasingly authoritarian governance model, is pushing it closer to becoming a de facto proxy state. The illusion of independence is maintained by highlighting certain diplomatic achievements, such as increased energy exports to the EU, but these moves are overshadowed by the deepening reliance on Moscow’s political and economic backing. As Aliyev tightens his grip on power, leveraging his relationship with Putin to suppress internal dissent and maintain control, Azerbaijan’s sovereignty is gradually eroding.
In this sense, Azerbaijan’s role as a transit is not merely logistical but ideological and political as well. By facilitating Russia’s strategic objectives, Azerbaijan is locking itself into a dependency that will be difficult to escape and the brief window of relative sovereignty that Aliyev enjoyed post-2020 could soon close. If current trends continue, Azerbaijan is on the way of not only becoming a strategic transit for Russia but also sliding into the role of a full-fledged proxy.
To be continued...
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