This analyse is originally published at Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
Despite only having achieved independence 30 years ago, Azerbaijan is quite well-known in international politics for sports and music events (including the European Games, Euro Cup semi-finals, and Eurovision), high-level meetings such as the upcoming COP29, corruption scandals, repression enacted by the authoritarian regime, the oil and gas business, and war with Armenia. This is the reductive image that an average European has of Azerbaijan. However, despite being true, this picture is incomplete and does not explain the historical path, day-to-day politics, social relations, and economy of Azerbaijan, nor, finally, Europe’s role in shaping the image of the country today.
Azerbaijan became independent in 1991 during the most recent wave of decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The struggle for independence was, according to the standard decolonial playbook, dominated by nationalist ideology. As a nation that has always been situated at the crossroads between empires, several strands of nationalist struggle emerged (Swietochowski 2016). Pan-Turkism was an attempt to integrate Azerbaijan into the Turkic world on the basis of ethnic and linguistic similarities. The Islamic movement saw Azerbaijan as a part of the world of Shia Islam, harking back to the days when Azerbaijan was part of Iran and the Muslim world. Secular nationalists represented modernisms bearing the marks of either European or Russian influence. This strand of nationalism was propagated, in part, by representatives of the former Soviet nomenklatura and by the liberal intelligentsia.
These various tendencies disappeared as soon as Azerbaijan’s violent struggle with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh[1] began. The losses in Nagorno-Karabakh translated into a shift in the relations of power in Baku. The nationalist groups that had been in power were defeated by members of the former Soviet nomenklatura, with Heydar Aliyev, the former head of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, again coming to power. Soon, nationalism, ideology, and political life in Azerbaijan were reduced to a single matter: the question of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Heydar Aliyev, with his authoritarian governing style, stabilized the situation in Azerbaijan. However, lacking the imagination on what to do with abundant natural resources (oil and gas), he simply invited foreign capital into the country and created a favourable situation for the international oil companies to extract and export oil. In 1994, Aliyev signed what became known as the “Contract of the Century” with a consortium led by BP (UK), which acquired a 34.1 percent share. The consortium including the following other companies: Chevron (with a 10.2 percent share), SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic) (10 percent), Statoil Hydro (8.6 percent), Exxon Mobil (8 percent), TPAO (6.8 percent), Devon (5.6 percent), ITOCHU (3.9 percent), Hess (2.7 percent) (Bashirov 2021) and other companies (11 percent).
The weak position of Azerbaijan at the time did not allow it to negotiate better conditions, and Azerbaijan received minor shares in the extractivist project. This, however, has changed now, and SOCAR’s shares have increased (O’Byrne 2024). Foreign capital was content with the way events developed. They received a one-stop-shop service from the Azerbaijani government (Bayulgen 2005), which signed Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) allowing foreign capital full immunity, even exempting it from the country’s constitution. PSAs became the main law between foreign capital and the Azerbaijani state. Thus, Aliyev opened the oil industry to neoliberal market principles while fully monopolizing all other industries of the economy and not allowing any other actor to invest. Along with this, he also kicked out the small and medium businesses and monopolized almost all industries around his family or other oligarchs connected to the family. This was the transition of Azerbaijan into a rentier state.
The rentier state extensively relies on foreign purchasing power and survives on selling natural resources (Beblawi and Luciani 2015). Under such developments, the rentier state does not depend on the local population, as all of its income comes from abroad. In such a situation, the local elite should distribute the income. However, in the case of Azerbaijan, local elites keep their profit and have detached themselves from the rest of the population. In Azerbaijan, the centralization of power reached the level where the whole decision-making process depended on one person — President Aliyev and his loyal elite. The state’s capacity and level of income are enough to buy in the loyalty of most of the population. The state provides the most jobs, employing around 35 percent of the population (Bashirov 2021), with extended families often being dependent on their employment (Franke et al. 2009).
With high income, a strong police apparatus, a small population, and the legacy of a strong state from the Soviet period, Azerbaijan has become a repressive state where any political dissent is brutally oppressed. Such repressions happen periodically, where between periods, new generations of activists emerge and civil society sprouts. However, these buds never bloom and are snipped at the root. Democracy should be killed in the cradle is the slogan and main principle of the Azerbaijani authorities.
After the death of Heydar Aliyev, power was transferred to his son — Ilham Aliyev. He has remained in power since 2003 and was seriously challenged in 2014 when global oil prices plummeted. Following this, the first wave of repression against civil society began, followed by a 32 percent depreciation of the currency vis-à-vis the US dollar (The Guardian 2015). This was the first time when the authorities realized the need for changes in governance and diversification of the economy, as oil cannot be a reliable resource. The government’s ability to buy loyalty directly depends on the oil prices and the level of rent received. However, Azerbaijan’s failure in this diversification and the aggressive transition to a green economy that we are now witnessing can be explained by the fear of a loss of power due to decreased demand for oil and gas. It could also be explained by the increased demand for gas exports to the EU, which Azerbaijan currently lacks. The authorities have tried to make more gas available by using renewables to meet domestic demand for energy (O’Byrne 2024a).
The wild card that Aliyev kept for the right moment in case of a threat to his power was a Nagorno-Karabakh. This wild card had and still has the power to consolidate the whole population around one cause and/or one person while pushing underlying problems, such as socio-economic inequalities, into the background. Aliyev first played this card in April 2016 (BBC 2016). A four-day clash ended with Russia’s intervention and Azerbaijan taking over a small village. The consolidation of power continued, and Aliyev implemented so-called “reforms” in the following years when he turned loyalty based on kinship and clan membership to loyalty to the technocratic government. This meant that the old system of regionalism and clans or kinship as the main form of social capital ceased to matter. Whereas previously the region where a person had their family origins played a role in government appointments — with people from various regions controlling different branches or ministries of the government — this kinship relationship now no longer matters. Aliyev also got rid of potential competitors and power holders among the remnants of the old Soviet nomenklatura.
However, the domestic situation was unstable and socio-economic needs were on the rise when Aliyev once again played the Nagorno-Karabakh card, this time launching a bloody war and taking over almost the whole region, fully expelling the Armenian population in 2023 (Reuters 2023).
Neocolonial Aspirations from the Crossroads under the Façade of “Decolonizing Climate”
Besides posing as a “climate warrior” (while operating as an oil-based rentier state), Azerbaijan is now also championing “decolonization” discourse, essentially appropriating progressive missions as its own. Azerbaijan’s attempts to engage in the green economy and its appropriation of the decolonial agenda are perfect examples of how a post-colonial nation-state project degenerates into a neocolonial aspiration, where the victim is not hesitant to become an aggressor.
Azerbaijan’s selective anti-colonialist agenda is a blatant example of political hypocrisy, appropriated from the metropolitan centres both in the West and the East. The official narratives of anti-colonialism became widespread after Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, mimicking the Russian version of selective anti-Western colonialism with the narratives reused from the Russian far-right political philosopher Alexander Dugin (Dugin 2020). More practical actions came years later when Azerbaijan chose GONGO-infused (government-controlled NGOs disguised as independent organizations) soft power for this game.
The Baku Initiative Group (Azernews 2023) was established on 6 July 2023, ostensibly with the aim of “eradicating de facto slavery in Africa and beyond,” which in theory sounds right, but in reality springs from deeply problematic underlying motives. The group was founded in Baku by participants of the “Complete Elimination of Colonialism” conference within the framework of the ministerial meeting of the Coordination Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement chaired by Azerbaijan. Yet the almost exclusive target of this group’s anti-colonialism is France, which Azerbaijan strategically focuses on for its (geo)political interests, justified by the tensions over France’s support for Armenia. The stance on anti-colonialism has gone as far as France accusing Azerbaijan of being behind recent protests over the French government’s decision to change a voting law in its Pacific island territory of New Caledonia (Al Jazeera 2024). While the Azerbaijani flag was waved in the air at protests in New Caledonia, Azerbaijan denied all the accusations, letting its GONGO-Baku Initiative Group carry on with its anti-colonialist mission of supporting the protesting Kanak people of New Caledonia (Report 2024).
The fussy outrage towards the colonialism of France conveniently ignores other colonial powers, such as Great Britain, Russia, and Turkey, highlighting Azerbaijan’s strategic alliances and economic interests. Playing a crucial role in Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War, both the UK and Turkey (Ambrose 2023; Synovitz 2020) have been welcomed as attendees of the anti-colonial conferences organized by the Baku Initiative Group. This targeting reveals Azerbaijan’s instrumentalization of anti-colonial rhetoric to advance right-wing political goals, undermining the genuine struggle against colonialism and exposing the initiative as a soft-power charade rather than a sincere effort for justice.
In line with this instrumentalization, a focus on the rights of Indigenous populations is at the forefront of Azerbaijan’s COP29 agenda. On 19 July 2024, Azerbaijan announced a multi-billion Climate Finance Action Fund (CFAF) to invest in climate action in the developing world: “CFAF will be capitalized with contributions from fossil fuel-producing countries and companies across oil, gas, and coal, and Azerbaijan will be a founding contributor” (Abdul 2024). While on the surface, these efforts appear to align with global climate justice and the promotion of South-South solidarity, one should stay critical. Azerbaijan’s appropriation of “decolonizing climate” issues and the use of “green capitalism” for political and economic gains are actually a result of several underlying dynamics.
By establishing the CFAF, Azerbaijan positions itself as a leader in climate finance, potentially enhancing its geopolitical influence. The Fund’s focus on attracting contributions from mining, fuel-producing countries, and major oil, gas, and coal companies reflects a strategic alignment with key economic sectors. This approach enables Azerbaijan to leverage its energy resources and expertise to gain political and economic clout on the international stage. The emphasis on public-private partnerships and mobilizing the private sector underscores a green capitalist agenda. By mitigating investment risks and providing concessional and grant-based support, Azerbaijan is fostering an environment where private investments in green projects are safeguarded, thus ensuring profitability while ostensibly promoting sustainability.
The prioritization of specific sectors, such as renewable energy, food, and agriculture, reflects a calculated approach to investment (COP29 2024). While these sectors are crucial for achieving sustainability, the selective focus may also be geared towards maximizing returns and maintaining control over key economic areas. Such an investment strategy will not only fail to prioritize the needs of these Indigenous communities, it will also create more dependencies, debt, and vulnerabilities for them. This reliance on external funding and expertise can hinder local self-sufficiency and perpetuate economic disparities. Furthermore, by dictating the development terms, these investments might limit the ability of Indigenous communities to manage and utilize their own resources according to their cultural practices and priorities.
Again, Azerbaijan’s narrative of extending financial and humanitarian aid to the developing world, including small island states, shows that the distinctions between neocolonialism and decolonialism are being obscured. Positing itself as a benevolent actor within the Global South by overstating its support to over 80 countries during the COVID-19 pandemic (Lmahamad 2021), Azerbaijan now mimics the actual appropriation tools of the neocolonial powers. When it comes to climate justice, the narrative of the necessity to support the Global South is reinforced by the governments’ emphasis on the vulnerability of these nations. However, the true extent of Azerbaijan’s commitment to decolonizing climate issues — addressing historical inequalities and empowering developing nations — remains ambiguous.
The Fund’s capital is split between supporting climate projects in developing countries and facilitating the development of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (COP29 2024). The push for NDC development, particularly aligned with the 1.5°C target, allows Azerbaijan to promote itself as a standard-bearer for ambitious climate action, potentially masking the primary economic motivations behind these initiatives. Specifically, Aliyev, in his speech at the 15th Petersburg Climate Dialogue, said:
“As the head of a country rich in fossil fuels, of course, we will defend the right of these countries to continue investments and production because the world needs it. But at the same time, countries with fossil fuels, as I have already mentioned, should be among those demonstrating solidarity with respect to issues related to climate change.” (President of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2024)
This version of decolonizing discourse invites scrutiny of how mechanisms of rhetorical enforcement—rooted in the strategic weaponization of climate narratives—are deployed in hybrid neoliberal contexts like Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s neoliberalism is hybrid because it combines elements of free-market policies with strong state intervention, particularly in sectors crucial to its economy, such as oil and gas. This blend allows the government to maintain control over strategic resources while promoting a façade of market liberalism aimed at attracting foreign investment. While showcasing green capitalism at UN climate talks, Azerbaijan’s version of climate neoliberalism manifests as green market liberalism, integrated into a broader modernization strategy. This strategy positions the country as a key Western partner across the post-Soviet region, despite its authoritarianism and militarism. This raises questions about who can do decarbonization and how, in post-colonial contexts like Azerbaijan, the consequences of neoliberal diffusion and the complicity of Western institutions in authoritarian practices lead to the complete appropriation of “de-anything”.
Today, that which began as the radical notion of imagining a world without fossil fuels has become a battle for market share over renewables, carbon offsets, and efficiency measures. Thus, “decolonizing climate” is nothing more than a move by capital to stave off regulations and continue business as usual. In another sense, it is an attempt to create a new model of growth with a broader horizon of social reproduction serving as the cornerstone of political and economic reorganization.
The upcoming COP29 conference, scheduled to take place from 11 to 22 November 2024, in the Azerbaijani capital, Baku, will centre on a Global Green Deal (CoR 2024) with the objective of harmonizing international frameworks for climate change, biodiversity, and sustainable development. The conference’s agenda is structured into thematic days, each dedicated to specific topics of critical importance.
A significant component of the conference is the focus on “Indigenous People” scheduled for November 21. Azerbaijan has underscored the importance of the green economy through the slogan “leave no one behind” (COP29 2024). This slogan reflects the core promise of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which commits member states to addressing poverty, discrimination, and inequality by tackling the root causes of marginalization. This framework emphasizes the integration of human rights considerations within the climate change discourse.
Nonetheless, the political realities in Azerbaijan present a stark contrast to these commitments. The country’s authoritarian and conservative regime, characterized by tendencies toward fascism, reveals a profound disparity between official rhetoric and the lived experience in Azerbaijan. The severe human rights violations and repressive actions against politically active individuals underscore this discrepancy.
Where Is Resistance to Be Found?
Politics in Azerbaijan has been stripped of its radical activism for a long time. The apolitical character of Soviet politics, followed by authoritarian management after independence, demobilized the people and left them completely apathetic in relation to politics, except for nationalist narratives.
Liberal civil society was heavily crushed (Goyushov 2015) for the first time in 2014, opening a space for radicalization of politics and activism. Starting from 2014, there was no established NGO or political party in the country, as registering new organizations was almost impossible. Receiving grants was equally impossible, and foreign organizations that had once flourished in Baku left the country. Civil society consisted of individuals and small grass-roots initiatives. This pushed younger people to activism beyond NGOs, to radical organizing. However, with the recent crackdowns ongoing in the country, which started last summer, the newly emerging energy for change was dismantled again.
Local communities that have been protesting against the injustices by the local police or executive officers were also brutally suppressed. The most recent communal uprising happened in June 2023. A group of people in Söyüdlü village in the north-west of Azerbaijan gathered to protest (Feminist Peace Collective 2023) against the creation of a second artificial reservoir that dumps the post-industrial processed waste from the Gadabay gold mine, operated by Anglo Asian Mining PLC with alleged connections (OCCRP 2016) to the ruling family. They were brutally suppressed. The whole village was blockaded, and police raided the village, using tear gas and arresting the protestors, many of whom are still in prison. The entrance to the village has been under continuous police surveillance until today. The blockade happened in parallel to the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh (Amnesty International 2023) and revealed the true face of the regime for many who doubted it. For the Azerbaijani government, Armenian separatist and Azerbaijani protestors were no different, both faced the same level of brutality. This was a sobering slap into the face to some nationalist groups.
After gaining full control over all disputed territories in the fall of 2023, Aliyev turned to domestic affairs and started a brutal crackdown on civil society. Independent media outlets like Abzas Media and Toplum TV (Eurasianet 2024) were shut down, their editors and staff arrested on heavy charges of smuggling money, their offices raided, and anyone affiliated with them either interrogated by police or arrested. This attack was followed by a smear campaign on activists that associated them with US spies and grant recipients (Eurasianet 2023), accusing them of wanting to destroy domestic political stability. The story goes that the US wants to destabilize the situation in Azerbaijan and funds feminist and queer activism. The topic of feminism and queer activism became a security question for the government. Again, there is nothing very creative here; it comes straight out of the playbook of your average anti-Western dictator. Arrests continue until today, with the most recent arrest of a Talysh scholar, Igbal Abilov (Farhadova 2024), and a young scholar, Bahruz Samadov (OC Media 2024), accusing them of collaborating with Armenians and of treason. Many other activists either left the country and went into exile, became invisible, or stopped their activities.
There are no groups in the country who can effectively oppose the government narrative. The government and its brutal, violent methods also employ soft politics, opening space and giving opportunities to less radical or less oppositional activist groups. Groups that can play along with the government-controlled narrative and adhere to established rules (such as not engaging in politics or criticizing the government, simply pinpointing the problems and helping the government to identify them) are allowed to exist. The government also uses them as a shield to create the image of a democratic state with a vibrant civil society. This is also used in domestic politics to portray others as traitors to the nation while everyone else who plays according to the rules is a good representative of civil society and truly patriotic.
However, notwithstanding this dire picture, resistance exists in various forms and continues to disturb the stability of people in the kingdom of oil and millions[2] cursed with an abundance of oil and gas.
COP29 in the Framework of Green Capitalism
Ecological modernization is increasingly shaping the international political agenda. The global accumulation of capital demands solutions for the severe impacts of the climate crisis. This is driven by the competitive, growth-oriented, and profit-driven principles of capitalism, without acknowledging capitalism itself as part of the problem. Many countries are adopting more pronounced “green” industrial policies. For example, the European Green Deal enhances financial incentives and legal frameworks for green innovations. Particularly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe has experienced an energy supply crisis. This led to swift agreements under the guise of “green” modernization and sustainability with various countries, including Azerbaijan.
To comprehend the ecological “greening” of the market model as a proposed solution, it is crucial to analyse green capitalism, which supposedly reject fossil fuels, as a new hegemonic project. Green capitalism generates new socio-ecological costs and shifts them onto others in space and time (cf. Brand et al. 2024a: 97). It is therefore crucial to briefly analyse the contradictions in the green capitalist project. A key indicator of the crisis is the search for solutions by organizations like the EU, with the European Green Deal of 2019 being a notable result. This initiative demonstrates how those in power are addressing social, economic, and environmental upheavals, along with shifting geopolitical and economic landscapes (ibid.: 102). Despite the severe climate crisis, the fundamental tone of the Green Deal (GD) remains optimistic. It is anticipated that addressing the climate crisis will not only open up new business opportunities and “green” growth prospects but also demonstrate the EU’s moral superiority. A frequently used slogan claims: Europe as the “first climate-neutral continent.”
The Illusion of Sustainability: Green Capitalism and Its Fossil Dependence
The Green Deal embodies the efforts to promote the green capitalism agenda through collaboration with “green” factions of capital and their business strategies. Its purpose is to revive the dynamism and legitimacy of the capitalist production system amid an acute crisis. It reassures the public that commissions, governments, and parliaments are addressing the urgency of the environmental crisis while its repercussions are being displaced onto other countries and special interests are being prioritized.
The Green Deal and the specific measures for its implementation integrate the changes into existing power structures and attempt to green these structures in certain areas. The European Green Deal could be viewed as a central component of a hegemonic expansion of eco-capitalist strategies (cf. Brand et al. 2024a: 114).
The European Green Deal comes under particularly vigorous attack from fossil capital, which also seeks to exploit it. This is because, alongside the hegemonic project of green capitalism, there is also a significant push to preserve the fossil economy.
A key problem is that achieving global decarbonization by 2050 will inevitably result in a substantial rise in raw material consumption. While the Green Deal implies that renewable energies are plentiful, it fails to acknowledge that the technologies needed for their production and distribution depend on fossil fuels and other raw materials like steel, lithium, cement, and rare earth elements (ibid.: 116).
A study conducted by Eurometaux and the University of Leuven, examining two scenarios, indicates that decarbonization by 2050 will lead to a dramatic increase in global consumption of several metals compared to 2020: aluminium by 43 percent, nickel by 168 percent, copper by 51 percent, and cobalt by 403 percent. Additionally, a 2023 Foresight study reveals that lithium demand for EU batteries will surge by a factor of 12 by 2030 and a factor of 21 by 2050 (ibid.: 116). Globally, lithium demand is expected to grow by a factor of 18 by 2030 and ninetyfold by 2050 (Carrara 2023). The shift to electric vehicles is, therefore, not only energy-intensive but also heavily dependent on raw materials (Groneweg 2021).
It is evident that some economic and political elites consider the decarbonization of the global economy, especially in developed countries and China, to be necessary. As a result, the green capitalist project receives support from significant societal forces, as it does not question capitalism’s fundamental growth-based logic and even suggests that the ecological crisis can be addressed with capitalism’s conciliatory formula: economic growth — only “green” (ibid.: 118). The implementation of the Green Deal specifically aims to deepen the systematic exploitation of external regions. In the proposed ecological modernization, the EU is portrayed positively as a “moral interventionist” and “global steward” of common interest, namely the successful fight against climate change. In this role, the EU aims to set global standards and create new markets (ibid.:117).
The influential political and economic forces behind the hegemonic project of green capitalism seek to ensure future conditions for capital accumulation through ecological modernization and to establish the requisite political frameworks. Concurrently, these forces are intensifying their efforts to organize access to external resources, especially raw materials and intermediate goods. States assume a coordinating role in managing conflicts and negotiating compromises between dominant actors and the governed (ibid.: 119). It should be recognized, in contrast to the assumptions of liberal propaganda, that market processes are always embedded within political contexts, and the state is not an external economic entity but an integral component of the capitalist mode of production (Hirsch 2005: 139). In this context, conferences like COP29 in Azerbaijan play a central role in establishing new markets for the stable accumulation and regulation of global capital in green. However, this often overlooks the accompanying socio-political conflicts, such as the repression of conservative or emancipatory political activists and journalists, the suppression of eco-protesters like those in Söyüdlü, and the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh as a result of the Azerbaijani invasion.
Contradictions of Green Capitalism in the Context of Azerbaijan
A central contradiction of green capitalism lies in the issue of raw materials. The development of infrastructure and the production of goods under green capitalism are both energy- and resource-intensive. This is particularly evident in the demand for critical raw materials across five strategic sectors: renewable energy, electromobility, industry, information and communication technology, and space and defence. Batteries for renewable energy, electromobility, cell phones, computers, and military defence applications are particularly important. The production of these batteries requires critical raw materials such as lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements, nickel, and particularly copper, which Azerbaijan possesses. Mining metals like copper and cobalt causes significant ecological harm and fossil fuel emissions, contradicting the goal of reducing CO2 emissions ahead of the COP—an example of greenwashing.
War and Colouring Capitalism
The demarcation and regulation of borders by nation-states, along with the control of fossil fuels and raw materials, are deeply intertwined with capitalist dynamics and mechanisms of capital accumulation. This connection is clearly demonstrated in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, where the military invasion by Azerbaijani forces highlights the interplay between territorial control and resource exploitation within a capitalist framework.
Following the Second Karabakh War in 2020, and especially after the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, extensive efforts have been made by Azerbaijan to position Nagorno-Karabakh as a lucrative resource hub, whether for renewable energy or the extraction of critical raw materials such as copper, cobalt, gold, silver, etc.
The 2022 agreement between the Azerbaijani government and the British company Anglo-Asian Mining, which involved three additional mining areas, increased the strategic importance of the Qizilbulag and Demirli gold mines in Nagorno-Karabakh. This heightened significance led to the implementation of the Lachin corridor blockade, which lasted more than ten months and led to starvation. The aim was to instil fear in Armenians so that they would no longer have any prospects on the ground. Although these mines were inactive at the time of signing the contract, their operation is reported to depend on the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status. This plan fit well with Azerbaijan’s geopolitical strategy, driven as it is by the imperative to control and reshape strategic spaces, aligned with broader capitalist interests in the region. Consequently, Azerbaijan’s military and diplomatic actions have aimed to secure a controlled (or authoritarian) peace, further consolidating its power at the expense of Armenia’s capitulation. On 28 September 2023, a decree was issued mandating the dissolution of Nagorno-Karabakh by 1 January 2024. This decision was facilitated by the war’s effects: in September, after a 10-month Azerbaijani blockade that led to fatal shortages of food, medicine, and energy, over 100,000 Armenians were forcibly displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh.
The cross-border flexibilization of capital and financial flows increases the pressure on each state to create optimal conditions for exploitation, such as stability and security (Hirsch 2005: 145), as observed in Azerbaijan. From a state-theoretical perspective, regional security and stability must be understood as ensuring the accumulation of capital. This includes, in particular, the guarantee of stable economic relations — an infrastructural precondition for the capitalist production and valorization process — and the unhindered transport of raw materials. Consequently, in this context, there was no significant international resistance to the expulsion of more than 100,000 Armenians.
A primary objective for economic development in Nagorno-Karabakh, as articulated by President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, is the conversion of these regions into a “green energy” zone. President Aliyev has outlined a strategic plan to create this Green Energy Zone (AREA n.d.), emphasizing the area’s significant renewable energy potential. The claim by President Aliyev to transform Nagorno-Karabakh into a “Green Zone” does not obviate the fact that critical raw materials such as cobalt and copper will continue to be extracted in large quantities from the region. Nagorno-Karabakh, known for its abundant mineral resources, holds strategic significance. Following the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, Mukhtar Babayev, Azerbaijan’s Minister of Environment and Natural Resources and President of COP29, hosted the inaugural GeoMining Baku mining fair in October 2023.
On October 26, 2023, Baku further underscored its mining aspirations by hosting the first international geology-mining forum (Azergold 2023), with over 30 countries in attendance. Babayev, who officially opened the forum (APA 2023), emphasized Azerbaijan’s considerable potential for international mining collaborations and the strategic importance of the mineral resources in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Zangazur region (Azernews 2024). These forums aim to attract corporate investment opportunities as Azerbaijan seeks to transform the region into a “green” zone, capitalizing on its abundant copper and cobalt resources (ACC n.d.), essential for the production of batteries, renewable energy cables, and military equipment. However, the significant CO2 emissions resulting from their production remain unaddressed.
In the context of transporting raw materials essential to the Western world, the issue of stable transportation routes becomes especially pertinent. Consequently, the most viable and secure option might be the implementation of a critical raw material supply route from Central Asia to Europe through Azerbaijan. The Nagorno-Karabakh region also serves as a potential economic transit route between Asia and Europe, particularly in the current geopolitical context. Azerbaijan is promoting the term “East and West Zangezur” to assert its historical claim over the area and control of this key corridor, which, however, is Armenian land located between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is aware that the EU has signed agreements for lithium production — a critical raw material for electric cars, e-bikes, batteries for solar energy, and computers — with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. With Iran and Russia unsuitable as routes, Nagorno-Karabakh, along with the “Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor,” is set to play a significant role as an international trade route for Azerbaijan (Azernews 2024).
What Is to Be Done?
COP29 represents an attempt to create new markets under the guise of solving the environmental crisis. Therefore, COP29 serves as a platform where the green capitalist narrative is normalized, creating the illusion of “greening” the old economic model while supposedly actively combating the climate crisis. It is, therefore, not surprising that liberal-democratic states, functioning as instruments of capital accumulation similar to authoritarian states, have no concerns about cooperating with regimes like Azerbaijan, all for the core aim of serving the global world economy — one of their primary functions — against the backdrop of severe human rights violations and repression against Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and against the Azerbaijani-speaking political landscape. When confronted with the dichotomy of “liberal democracy versus authoritarianism,” these liberal democratic nation-states assert their moral superiority. However, they simultaneously contribute to the authoritarian conditions in Azerbaijan while maintaining their stance of moral high ground.
It is clear, however, that global capital accumulation demands solutions to the severe impacts of the climate crisis, driven by the competitive, growth-oriented, and profit-driven principles of capitalism, without recognizing capitalism itself as part of the problem. The climate crisis cannot be addressed without transforming the economy. Even if it is green: the capitalist mode of production is the primary reason humanity is exceeding planetary boundaries and heading into a potentially catastrophic situation. Capitalism, due to its inherent logic of competition, growth, and profit, is structurally blind to its own social and ecological impacts. It stems from the growth imperative of an economic system that relies on competition and fossil fuels. Climate change represents the dark side of the societal acceptance and global spread of emission-intensive patterns of production and consumption. Additionally, it is fuelled by the tolerance of social inequality and the destructive activities of the super-rich, such as their investment decisions.
The climate crisis is worsened by the ongoing rise in demand for raw materials and energy under green capitalism, as it supports the global capitalist production and growth system. This increase is partly driven by digitalization and the partial decarbonization efforts, known as the “twin transition.” In contrast to strategies that affirm modernization, transformative strategies could be considered. Discussions on downsizing based on solidarity have been actively ongoing for some time under terms such as “post-growth” and “degrowth” (cf. Brand et al. 2024b: 208), in contrast to the capitalist-driven growth pressures that are perpetuated by conferences like COP29. As long as these problems are not addressed at their roots, namely by questioning the global economic model, conferences like COP29 will only continue to accelerate the climate crisis.
Works Cited
President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 2024. “Speech by Ilham Aliyev in the High Level Segment of the 15th Petersberg Climate Dialogue ”, official website of the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 26 April 2024, https://president.az/en/articles/view/65703 (last accessed 30 October 2024).
Abdul, Nazrin. 2024. “Azerbaijan Takes Bold Steps in Global Climate Leadership & Financial Aid at COP29 [COMMENTARY]”, Azernews, 26 July 2024, https://www.azernews.az/analysis/229118.html (last accessed 30 October 2024).
Azerbaijan Geographic Society (ACC). N.d. “Mineral Resources of Azerbaijan”, https://gsaz.az/en/articles/view/92/Azarbaycanin-faydali-qazintilari (last accessed 30 October 2024).
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[1] Karabakh has had different borders during different historical periods and under different empires. In fact, it is almost impossible to draw a coherent border for the Karabakh area today without triggering a political dispute. Most recently, under the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh (Russian for “Mountainous Karabakh”) was an autonomous oblast within Soviet Azerbaijan. However, the term Karabakh was used in everyday life both by Armenians and Azerbaijanis for a wider region (including lower parts of Karabakh). Historically, when the conflict emerged in the late 1980s, the contested borders were more or less those of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast. Hence, Nagorno-Karabakh is widely accepted in the literature as a name of both the region and the conflict. Today, every toponym and name within the area is widely contested and using any other term might coincide with one or another political position. To avoid this, we use, as fairly neutral terms, “Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” or “the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan” or “the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict”.
[2] The phrase is a literary reference to the first Azerbaijani art film shot in 1916. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_the_Kingdom_of_Oil_and_Millions
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